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Abstract With growth in foreign investment and in the number of companies
investing in foreign countries, the application of general principles of public
international law has not been deemed adequate to regulate foreign investment and
there is, as yet, no comprehensive international treaty on the regulation of foreign
investment. Consequently, states have resorted to bilateral investment treaties
(BITs), regional trade and international investment agreements (IIAs) and free trade
agreements to supplement and complement the regime of protection for foreign
investors. In the absence of an international investment court, states hosting foreign
investment or investor states have opted for investor-state dispute settlement
mechanism (ISDS). This mechanism has brought about its own challenges to the
international law of foreign investment due to inconsistency in the application and
interpretation of the key principles of international investment law by such arbi-
tration tribunals, and further, there is no appellate mechanism to bring about some
cohesion and consistency in jurisprudence. Therefore, there are various proposals
mooted by scholars to address these challenges and they range from tweaks to BITs
and IIAs, the creation of an appellate mechanism and the negotiation of a multi-
lateral treaty to proposals for reform of ISDS only. After assessing the merits and
demerits of such proposals, this study goes further, arguing for the creation of a
World Investment Organisation with a standing mechanism for settlement of
investment disputes in order to ensure legal certainty, predictability and the pro-
motion of the flow of foreign investment in a sustainable and responsible manner.
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1 Introduction
The international investment regime is currently encountering an unprecedented
level of public scrutiny. Investment regulation has, in recent years, received
attention far beyond the confines of a small group of investment negotiators,
practitioners and academics. This is because the law of foreign investment is in a
state of flux and the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism has been
criticised for producing inconsistency and confusion in jurisprudence, resulting in
public backlash against ISDS. The mechanism was initially designed primarily for
settling narrow commercial law disputes of private law character, however, it is now
often called upon to adjudicate upon public law matters affecting the rights of the
public in many countries. The problem is further compounded by the absence of a
comprehensive international treaty pronouncing the substantive provisions on the
regulation of foreign investment. Unlike in international trade law or international
human rights law, there is as yet no single comprehensive international treaty
regulating foreign investment, spelling out what the law is and what would be the
mechanism to enforce the law. Consequently, many experts1 are of the opinion that
the current system is simply not working, as evidenced by the fact that a number of
states are terminating their bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and others are
publicly retreating from investment arbitration. For example, South Africa is
systematically terminating all of its BITs with the ultimate aim of introducing
domestic legislation, which will govern the treatment of foreign investors in its
territory.2 There is some clear evidence that other states may follow suit, with
Indonesia already discontinuing 17 out of 64 international investment agreements
(IIAs) and intending to discontinue more in the years ahead.3 Nicaragua and
Venezuela have also signalled similar intention.4 Bolivia,5 Ecuador6 and
Venezuela7 have all already denounced the 1965 ICSID Convention. Furthermore,
1 See for example UNCTAD (2015a); UNCTAD (2015b); Waibel et al. (2010); Van Harten (2008);
Kalicki and Joubin-Bret (2015); Hachez and Wouters (2012); Schill (2014), p. 795.
2 See UNCTAD IIA Navigator, South Africa has very few BITs and IIAs currently in force; many have
been terminated recently, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/195#iiaInnerMenu
(accessed 30 January 2017); see also Kron and Clark (2015).
3 Jailani (2015).
4 Appleton (2010) as cited in Trakman (2013), p. 344.
5 Manciaux (2007).
6 International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) News Release, 9 July 2009,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType=
AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=NewsReleases&pageName=Announcement20 (accessed 30 January
2017).
7 ICSID News Release, 26 July 2010, https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=
CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=Announcements&page
Name=Announcement100 (accessed 30 January 2017).
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there are rumours swirling that Argentina might be the next state to announce its
denunciation from ICSID.8 Interestingly, in 2008, more than 50% of registered
ICSID cases were pending against Latin American countries. Moreover, in 2012,
around 25% of new ICSID disputes involved a Latin American respondent.9 It is
telling that the most frequent respondents in ICSID arbitration are the ones who
appear to have lost faith in the system.10
Interestingly in 2012, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) also recommended ‘limiting resort to ISDS and increasing the role of
domestic judicial systems […] or even refraining from offering ISDS’.11 Addition-
ally, the potential inclusion of ISDS in the proposed Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Canada-EU Comprehensive Trade and
Economic Agreement (CETA) caused public outcry.12 As a result of public
criticism, the European Commission had to re-think its plans for these free trade
agreements (FTAs), and in the end proposed an Investment Court System (ICS) in
both agreements.13 This appears to have catalysed the Commission to begin work on
a multilateral ICS.14 Whilst some have welcomed these steps, others are sceptical
that the proposed ICS in TTIP and CETA at least, is simply a case of old wine in a
new bottle.15
With these issues in mind, this paper will begin by setting out the main
procedural and substantive problems with the current regime of foreign investment
protection, as well as conducting an analysis of the decisions of investment tribunals
to illustrate the point of inconsistency in jurisprudence. Next, will be a brief
examination of the importance of ‘getting it right’ in the sphere of foreign
investment. In light of the problems with the regime and given what is at stake, the
paper will make a novel suggestion for consideration; the establishment of a
completely independent World Investment Organisation (WIO). The paper will go
on to examine how a WIO could remedy most, if not all of the main problems with
the law of foreign investment. Finally, the concluding section will reflect on the
enormity of the task of establishing a WIO.
8 Hogan Lovells News, http://www.hoganlovells.com/newsmedia/newspubs/pubDetail.
aspx?publication=8717 (accessed 30 January 2017); see also Dalmaso Marques (2014).
9 Titi (2014), p. 357.
10 Ibid., Titi argues that, ‘the overall Latin American approach does not amount to a rejection of
investment arbitration, nor should it necessarily be perceived as particularly hostile to it’.
11 UNCTAD (2012c) pp. 43–44.
12 See for example Dearden (2016).
13 EU Commission, Draft text on investment in TTIP, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/
2015/september/tradoc_153807.pdf (accessed 31 January 2017); see CETA, available at http://trade.ec.
europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf (accessed 31 January 2017).
14 EU Commission, ‘A future multilateral investment court’, Press Release, 13 December 2016, available
at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-4350_en.htm (last accessed 31 January 2017).
15 See for example Reinisch (2016), p. 761.
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2 Problems with the Current Regime of Foreign Investment Regulation
2.1 Procedural Problems
2.1.1 Whether BITs Actually Attract/Increase Foreign Investment
Conventional wisdom states that the main reason that states sign BITs and IIAs is to
attract foreign investment. It was accepted that having such agreements in place
would create a favourable investment climate for foreign investors, and would
attract greater levels of foreign direct investment (FDI). However, this conventional
wisdom is now increasingly being questioned. Whether BITs actually increase FDI
inflows has been the central question in a number of studies by researchers; results
have been mixed.16 One study concluded that the existence of BITs has little effect
on the investment decisions of companies.17 Thus, the notion that BITs are a vehicle
to attract greater FDI inflows is highly questionable. If it is accepted that BITs do
not attract or promote greater levels of FDI, one has to question their continued
existence as a prominent feature of the law of foreign investment regime.
2.1.2 Investment Arbitration
ISDS is currently the preferred investment dispute settlement mechanism, and is
commonly provided for by the network of over 3000 BITs and IIAs in operation.18
The number of ISDS cases has exploded since the late 1990s: in 1999, just 11 new
investment cases were registered, whereas in 2015, a record setting 70 new cases
were registered.19 It is important to note that these figures represent the known
number of cases. In reality, the actual number of cases is likely to be higher, as
many remain unpublished (at the wishes of the parties involved). With the explosion
of investment arbitrations, criticism of ISDS has been growing, and in recent years,
has culminated in somewhat of a backlash against the system.20
Firstly, there is a lack of democratic accountability.21 Typically, investment
tribunals consist of a three-arbitrator panel. Often, each party will select an
arbitrator, and the third (often presiding) arbitrator, is selected by the mutual
agreement of the parties. Pragmatically, parties are likely to choose individuals who
they believe will offer the greatest chance of ‘winning’. Indeed the former
Singaporean Attorney General and current Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon cast
doubt on the qualification and independence of investment arbitrators in his 2012
16 Neumayer and Spess (2005), p. 1567; Mann and Von Moltke (2005); Sauvant and Sachs (2009);
Aisbett (2009); Poulsen (2010); Yackee (2010), p. 397; Peinhardt and Allee (2012), p. 757; Jandhyala and
Weiner (2014), p. 649.
17 Hogan Lovells, Bingham Centre, BIICL and Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘Risk and return: foreign
direct investment and the rule of law’ (Briefing Note, May 2015).
18 UNCTAD IIA Navigator, supra n. 2.
19 UNCTAD (2016), p. xii.
20 Waibel et al. (2010), p. xxxix.
21 Ibid., p. xxxx.
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keynote speech at the International Council for Commercial Arbitration.22 He went
on to outline his critical views on the application of both substantive laws and
procedural rules by international investment law tribunals, arguing that many such
tribunals had interpreted the substantive laws beyond the original intention of the
parties that concluded individual investment treaties.23
Indeed, private individuals of questionable qualification, are being called upon to
settle public disputes. Investment disputes are often considered to be public in
nature, because they involve the state as a party, and often involve complex issues
of public interest and public policy. This is problematic because private investment
tribunals, ‘wield enormous power—displacing local courts and making decisions
about the rules that govern major portions of host country economies and, by
extension, their societies’.24 Thus, the decisions of investment tribunals often
effectively limit the powers of host states to regulate their internal affairs.
Commentators have expressed concern about this, asserting that it, ‘under-
mine[s] basic principles of democratic representation and accountability’25 and
that investment treaty arbitration cannot provide the quality of review necessary for
public law adjudication.26 Furthermore, although the decisions in investment
disputes are only directly applicable to the parties to the dispute, in reality, ‘the
pronouncements that these tribunals make as to the existence or non-existence of an
alleged rule of international foreign investment law or the meaning and scope of a
rule have wider ramifications and implications for other states as well as for
international law as a whole’.27
Additionally, investment tribunals frequently ‘cherry-pick’ the rules which will
be applied to the dispute, often choosing to ignore public international law rules.28
Concerns have also been raised regarding the inadequate representation of
developing states amongst panels of arbitrators.29 This is hardly surprising, given
that arbitrators are frequently top-flight counsel turning their hand to adjudication.
Such highly qualified legal personnel are traditionally much more likely to hail from
richer, developed states which are most often home to the prestigious educational
institutions.
Investment arbitration is also criticised for tolerating potential conflicts of
interest; the pool of potential arbitrators is very small indeed. So much so, that
arbitrators may very well have worked as counsel for the disputing parties in other
cases. Even if they have not done so, arbitrators obviously have an interest in repeat
business, thus they may be partial to the party that selected them. In any case,
arbitrators obviously have a ‘vested interest in maintenance of the status quo’.30
22 Menon (2012).
23 Menon (2015), pp. 219–245.
24 Leader (2006), p. 684.
25 Van Harten (2005), p. 600.
26 See for example Van Harten (2007).
27 Subedi (2016), p. 172.
28 Ibid.
29 Waibel et al. (2010).
30 Ibid.
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ISDS is also heavily criticised for allowing too much confidentiality31 in
proceedings and for a lack of transparency.32 Traditionally in commercial disputes,
emphasis was placed on the need for confidentiality in order to ensure the businesses
of the respective parties was not harmed. In turn, this high degree of confidentiality
translated into a very opaque process. Confidentiality could be justified, with the
outcome of the arbitration having little or no effect outside the relationship between
the contracting parties. However, in investment disputes, such a high degree of
confidentiality is less easy to justify. Citizens have the right to know that these types
of disputes are occurring and how they are being settled, because important public
issues and resources are at stake. It is important to note that there has recently been a
significant shift towards greater transparency of procedure; the UNCITRAL Rules
on transparency, which came into effect 1 April 2014, have made important inroads
to transparency within the UNCITRAL arbitral rules. Furthermore, the UN opened
its Transparency Convention up for signature in March 2015. The UN Transparency
Convention will allow states wishing to do so, to apply the UNCITRAL
Transparency Rules to BITs and IIAs that were negotiated before the Rules came
into effect on 1 April 2014. However, it is equally important to note that only one
institution has so far made any real progress in this regard. There are many fora that
still need to address this issue.33
A final concern with ISDS is the lack of consistency of decisions. There have
been a number of highly publicised decisions which demonstrate the lack of
consistency in international investment arbitration; in cases where the facts are the
same or very similar, different investment tribunals have managed to reach
diametrically opposing decisions.34 A case in point are the Lauder arbitrations in
which two investment tribunals came to completely contradictory conclusions in
spite of there being almost identical factual matrix, parties and legal norms.35 There
is no de jure doctrine of precedent in international investment law. This is because
the roots of ISDS can be found in commercial arbitration between two private
parties. However, ISDS disputes are, by their very nature, between an investor and a
state. A natural consequence of state involvement means that public issues are often
brought to the fore in disputes. Given the important difference between commercial
cases and investment disputes, it is, at the very least, arguable that there should be
greater consistency of decisions and, in turn, promotion of the rule of law. It should
31 Dimsey (2008), pp. 36–37; also see Paulsson and Rawding (1995), p. 303.
32 Waibel et al. (2010), p. xxxx.
33 There appears to be mounting pressure for ICSID to increase its efforts as regards transparency
according to some authors. See for example Parra (2012).
34 Some of the most famous examples of such inconsistent decisions include CME and Lauder (CME
Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, Ad hoc—UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Partial Award of 13
September 2001 and IIC 62 (2003), Final Award of 14 March 2003 and Lauder v. Czech Republic, Ad
hoc—UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Final Award, 3 September 2001) as well as the SGS cases (SGS
Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13
(2003), 42 ILM 1290 and SGS Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6 (2004)). For academic commentary of inconsistencies see for example Franck
(2005), p. 1521.
35 Lauder v. Czech Republic, supra n. 34, pp. 5–7.
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be noted that the terms ‘consistency’ and ‘coherence’ do not simply mean imitation
of previous solutions; it is much more complicated than that. It involves examining
previous decisions where the same or similar issues are at stake and comparing them
with the present case. Perhaps in the present case there might be some material fact,
which means that the case can be distinguished from the previous case(s). The work
carried out by a commission led by Giardina and the Institut de Droit International’s
Tokyo Resolution is interesting in this regard.36
As a result of the many problems which plague ISDS, a number of reforms have
been proposed in recent years,37 but to date, reform has been minimal. When it
comes to ISDS, ‘it seems that despite a pressing need for (r)evolution, conservatism
firmly holds the international investment legal regime’.38
2.2 Substantive Rules and Law-Making
2.2.1 National Treatment and the Overprotection of FDI and Investors
National Treatment provisions usually provide that foreign investors will be treated
no less favourably than domestic investors in like circumstances. However, in
reality the investment protections available to foreign investors can often exceed
those legal protections available to domestic investors, leading to reverse
discrimination.39 For example, foreign investors usually have the ability to
effectively sue the investment host state government through ISDS, whilst domestic
investors will most likely have to pursue any arising dispute in the national courts.
Access to investment arbitration is considered to be a significant advantage for
investors.
2.2.2 Problems with Law-Making Mechanisms
Another significant problem with the law-making mechanisms is that they are so
devolved from any central control, that what has been created is commonly referred
to as a ‘spaghetti bowl’40 system of BITs and IIAs. There are currently more than
3000 BITs and IIAs in operation.41 This chaotic system encourages treaty, forum
and nationality shopping,42 as well as parallel dispute settlement proceedings.43
36 Institut de Droit International, Tokyo Resolution, 13 September 2013, Preamble, http://www.idi-iil.
org/idiE/resolutionsE/2013_tokyo_en.pdf (accessed 30 January 2017).
37 See for example UNCTAD (2013).
38 Hachez and Wouters (2012).
39 See WTO Working Group on Trade and Investment, WTO Doc. WT/WGTI/W/122, 27 June 2002,
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/july/tradoc_113951.pdf (accessed 30 January 2017); see also
Waibel et al. (2010), p. xxxviii.
40 See for example UNCTAD (2008).
41 UNCTAD (2014).
42 Yannaca-Small (2006).
43 Yannaca-Small (2008), p. 1009. See also Kreindler (2010), pp. 127–150.
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Treaty, forum and nationality shopping occur when investors carefully and
deliberately select the rules that will be applied to them. For example, ingenious
investors have been finding ways to swap nationalities for example, in order that
their investment will benefit from more generous treaty terms.
Parallel proceedings are becoming increasingly problematic and common in
international investment law dispute resolution. Parallel proceedings are, for the
purposes of this work, defined as the situation occurring where the same parties
initiate the same proceedings in more than one forum.44 Investors seeking to pursue
claims often have a choice of fora available to them, and may choose to pursue
multiple claims (as this is often not expressly forbidden). Parallel proceedings are
problematic for a variety of reasons, but especially because they can lead to
conflicting awards being rendered.45
In instances where parallel proceedings occur, there are two jurisdictional
regulating rules which may be applied; res judicata and lis pendens. However, their
application in international litigation is less clear than in domestic proceedings: they
are not contained in arbitration institution rules or in international investment
agreements, and they are not frequently referred to in investment disputes.46
Parallel proceedings may also be regulated through treaty-based methods, such as
provisions requiring the exhaustion of local remedies, fork-in-the-road provisions,
no U-turn clauses, waiver and umbrella clauses or through the consolidation of
claims. The UNCITRAL Rules and the ICSID Convention do not provide for the
consolidation of claims at the present time. Additionally, consolidation of claims
has not yet become standard BIT practice.47
Parallel proceedings in international investment law significantly increase the
risk of conflicting decisions. Although it may be argued that such divergent
decisions do not occur frequently, one cannot ignore the possibility that they may
occur. Furthermore, the possibility of them occurring is ever-increasing, due to the
multitude of investment agreements that are now in force, and many more which are
currently being negotiated. In international investment disputes, where important
public interest issues are often at stake, the outcome of such inconsistent decisions
may be very serious indeed. Whilst there are a number of devices in existence which
may limit the possibility of parallel proceedings, such devices are not mandatory,
and as such multiple proceedings can and do sometimes occur.48
2.2.3 The Scope of Fair and Equitable Treatment
Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) clauses ‘protect investors against serious
instances of arbitrary, discriminatory or abusive conduct by host states’.49 Although
44 Yannaca-Small (2008), p. 1009; Kreindler (2010); Dimsey (2008), p. 140.
45 Yannaca-Small (2008).
46 Yannaca-Small (2008), pp. 1012–1025. See also Reinisch (2010), p. 123.
47 OECD (2006), pp. 226–239.
48 Yannaca-Small (2008), p. 1045.
49 UNCTAD (2012b).
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there are differences in wordings of FET provisions, there has been some
convergence on the interpretation of the standard generally. It is thought to include:
(a) Prohibition of manifest arbitrariness in decision-making;
(b) Prohibition of denial of justice;
(c) Prohibition of targeted discrimination on manifestly wrongful grounds;
(d) Prohibition of abusive treatment;
(e) Protection of the legitimate expectations.50
Interestingly, FET is the most relied upon and most successful basis for claims
under investment treaty arbitration.51 However, the concept is also very vague and
open to diverse interpretation in its application, thus, ‘the content of this standard
has caused much anxiety’.52 Indeed, ‘there has been a noticeable trend in arbitral
practice away from the classic customary international law standard of treatment of
aliens towards a less stringent reading of the standard’.53 In fact, Kla¨ger notes that,
‘[i]t is both fascinating and astonishing that FET treatment has developed from an
almost vacant expression into an obligation of such potential breadth within a few
years’.54
Traditionally,
the FET standard—regardless of how it is expressed—came into existence as
an expression of the minimum standard of treatment. However, where the FET
obligation is not expressly linked textually to the minimum standard of
treatment of aliens, many tribunals have interpreted it as an autonomous, or
self-standing one. Instead of deriving the content of the standard from its
original source (customary international law), these tribunals chose to focus on
the literal meaning of the provision itself.55
Where the FET provision is tied to customary international law, the threshold for
liability of breach of FET is much higher. In such situations, breach has been limited
to cases where the host state government has acted disgracefully.56 In the seminal
Neer case (1926), the Commission set out quite an extreme test for FET, stating that,
Without attempting to announce a precise formula, it is in the opinion of the
Commission possible to […] hold (first) that the propriety of governmental
acts should be put to the test of international standards, and (second) that the
treatment of an alien, in order to constitute an international delinquency,
should amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or to an
insufficiency of governmental action so far short of international standards
50 Ibid., p. xvi.
51 Ibid.
52 Sornarajah (2010), p. 204.
53 UNCTAD (2012b).
54 Kla¨ger (2010), p. 443.
55 UNCTAD (2012b).
56 LFH Neer and Pauline Neer (United States v. Mexico) (1926) 4 RIAA 60.
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that every reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its
insufficiency.57
In 2009, the Glamis case confirmed that the Neer standard is still applicable, ‘an
act must be sufficiently egregious and shocking’.58
However, in some cases where the FET provision is not qualified by reference to
customary international law, the threshold for breach has been interpreted as much
lower, thereby catching more state actions as breaches of the standard.59
Nonetheless, several tribunals have suggested that an autonomous FET standard
does not differ significantly from the international minimum standard/customary
international law standard.60 Others have said that the threshold required for finding
violation of an autonomous FET clause is still ‘high’.61 Another tribunal suggested
that ‘in order to violate the [unqualified FET] standard, it may be sufficient that
States’ conduct displays a relatively lower degree of inappropriateness’,62 compared
with the international minimum standard.
Interestingly, the case of Merrill & Ring Forestry63 has suggested that there is
only one universal FET standard, and that anything other than a single universal
concept ‘would be to countenance an unacceptable double standard’,64 In that case,
the tribunal stated that the autonomous FET standard had become part of the
international law.65
However, this universal concept of FET has not been embraced by all
commentators, with some asserting that the diverging thresholds for finding breach
of FET have led to a spectrum of FET liability.66 Thus, from the jurisprudence, it
seems that there is no general consensus on when FET obligations have been
breached by states.
57 Ibid.
58 Glamis Gold Ltd v. United States, UNCITRAL Rules, Award, 8 June 2009.
59 Cases which have not linked FET to the international minimum standard, but rather view FET as an
autonomous concept include SGS Surveillance v. Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11; Occidental
Exploration and Petroleum Co. v. Ecuador, UNCITRAL Rules, Award, 1 July 2004; Siemens AG v.
Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8; Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets LP v. Argentina, ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/3; LG v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1.
60 Rumeli Telekom v. Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Award, 29 July 2008, para. 611; Biwater
Gauff v. Tanzania, ICSID Case No ARB/05/22, Award, 24 July 2008, para. 592; Duke Energy v. Ecuador,
ICSID Case No. ARB/04/19, Award, 18 August 2008, para. 337; Saluka v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL,
Partial Award, 17 March 2006, para. 291; Azurix v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Final Award,
14 July 2006, para. 361; CMS v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, 12 May 2005,
paras. 282–284; Occidental Exploration and Petroleum Co. v. Ecuador, supra n. 59, para. 190.
61 Biwater Gauff, supra n. 60.
62 Saluka, supra n. 60.
63 Merrill & Ring Forestry v. Canada, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Award, 31 March 2010.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Jones and Jhangiani (2014).
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2.2.4 The Application of Most Favoured Nation Clauses
Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clauses enable ‘nationals of the parties to profit from
favourable treatment that may be given to nationals of third states by either
contracting state’.67 MFN clauses essentially attempt to provide equality of
treatment at the highest standard, and prevent discrimination. It should be noted that
some tribunals, for example in the Maffezini case,68 have interpreted MFN very
expansively. As a result, MFN clauses have been accepted as covering jurisdictional
matters or matters concerning the administration of justice.69 A number of
tribunals70 have followed the Maffezini decision, though some71 did question the
validity of the expansive interpretation of MFN clauses in that case, and tried to
limit the operation of MFN clauses somewhat. Nonetheless, there is no consensus
on the application of the MFN standard.
2.2.5 The Operation of Umbrella Clauses
Umbrella clauses have also proven to be a cause for concern in the law of foreign
investment. It was a generally accepted principle in international law that the breach
of a contract by a state does not automatically give rise to direct international
responsibility (i.e. a treaty breach). Nonetheless, most recently, many BITs have
included ‘umbrella clauses’, which are thought to give rise to a sort of blanket
protection for foreign investors against the contract breaching state. In such
situations, breach of contract gives rise to breach of BIT/IIA, which in turn,
activates protections available under the law of foreign investment. This is
essentially an extension of foreign investment law to contractual disputes;
muddying the separation of public and private law.72
2.2.6 Expropriation
In international law, sovereign states have the right to take property that is held by
nationals or aliens and nationalise it, provided that certain, narrowly defined,
cumulative conditions are met:
(i) Property must be taken for a public purpose;
(ii) On a non-discriminatory basis;
(iii) In accordance with the due process of law;
67 Sornarajah (2010), p. 204.
68 Maffezini v. Spain (2005) 5 ICSID Reports 396.
69 Subedi (2016), p. 168.
70 See for example Siemens v. Argentina, supra n. 59, and Gas Natural SDG SA v. Argentina, ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/10 of 17 June 2005.
71 See for example Salini Construttori SPA and Italstrade SPA v. Kingdon of Jordan, ICISD Case No.
ARB/02/13 of 15 November 2004 and Plama Construction v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24 of 8
February 2005, both of which appear to attempt to reign in the effects of the earlier liberal interpretations
of MFN clauses.
72 Subedi (2016), p. 102.
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(iv) Accompanied by compensation.73
Expropriation may be direct, involving direct taking or seizure or property. Or, it
may be indirect, where action which falls short of direct taking can have the effect
of depriving the owner of the property, or destroying its value. BITs and IIAs often
include clauses clarifying the situations in which the investment host state party to
the agreement may or may not expropriate assets, and clarifying the level of
compensation that would be payable in the event of such expropriation. A
significant number of investment disputes have been brought involving expropri-
ation, and such cases have arguably muddied the waters of what behaviour
amounted to expropriation. As Sornarajah asserts, ‘what constitutes an act of taking
of foreign property in international law was once clear but has now come to be
befuddled with difficulty as a result of the progressive expansion of the concept of
taking’.74 Examples of actions which may amount to expropriation include: the
exercise of management control over the investment; cancellation of permits and
licences; taking by agents; excessive taxation; expulsion of the investor; freezing
bank accounts; and exchange controls.75
3 The Importance of Getting It Right: What Is at Stake?
3.1 Protecting the Regulatory Power of the State
When entering into BITs and IIAs, states have to reconcile their constantly changing
domestic political, economic and environmental landscapes with honouring promises
made to foreign investors. From time to time, the regulatory activities of the state may
have a detrimental effect on a foreign investor’s investment. If this occurs, the foreign
investor will usually seek to initiate ISDS proceedings. It seems odd that states would
choose to effectively limit their regulatory power in such a way. Pauwelyn76 asserts
that states agree to limit this power out of self-interest; in order to attract investment.77
The purported benefits of foreign investment are well documented.78
In order to benefit from foreign investment, states may, in certain situations, have
to compromise their regulatory power. Therefore, ‘a delicate balance needs to be
struck between the regulatory powers of the host state and the need to legally protect
the interests of foreign investors’.79 At present, it is arguable that this delicate
73 UNCTAD (2012a).
74 Sornarajah (2010).
75 Ibid., pp. 400–407.
76 Pauwelyn (2014), p. 372.
77 Though the extent to which the self-limitation of power through the signing of BITs and IIAs does
attract investment is currently being questioned. Neumayer and Spess (2005), p. 1567; Mann and Von
Moltke (2005); Sauvant and Sachs (2009); Aisbett (2009); Poulsen (2010); Yackee (2010), p. 397;
Peinhardt and Allee (2012), p. 757; Jandhyala and Weiner (2014), p. 649.
78 Trakman and Ranieri (2013), p. 11.
79 Gazzini (2012), p. 113.
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balance has not been achieved, and that the balance rests very much in favour of
investors.
3.2 The Costs of Investment and Arbitration
Another compelling reason to make sure that the investment regime functions to the
best of its ability is the amount of money that is often at stake. Companies often
invest millions, if not billions of pounds in host states. Moreover, the cost of claims
and awards in the event of a dispute should be taken into account; recently, the
Permanent Court of Arbitration awarded $50 billion in an expropriation claim
against Russia.80 It is also important to note that the legal costs involved in an
individual dispute average out at around $4 million for both claimants and
respondents.81 With such sums at stake, it is important that the law of foreign
investment functions as well as possible.
3.3 Ongoing and Future Plurilateral Negotiations
A full re-examination of the investment regime is timely with the current trend
towards the negotiation of plurilateral trade and investment agreements, as these
negotiations have the potential to shape the future of global trade and investment
policy.
Taking the TTIP negotiations as an example, one of the most highly contested
issues has been the potential inclusion of ISDS as the default dispute settlement
mechanism. Public outcry about the ability of foreign investors being effectively
able to sue sovereign governments from various stakeholders82 has caused the EU to
reconsider its position. Accordingly, the EU Commission now proposes the
inclusion of a bilateral investment court in TTIP. The ICS will make use of a
‘Tribunal of First Instance’, where ‘judges’ will pronounce on the dispute. If a party
wishes to appeal the decision, they will be able to do so by making an application to
the ‘Appeal Tribunal’. Awards would be enforceable through the New York
Convention 1958 or the ICSID Convention 1965.83 The ICS mechanism has already
been included in the concluded Canada-EU agreement CETA.84 Despite the
inclusion of the word ‘court’ in the name, many commentators have come to the
conclusion that the ICS mechanism is largely an ‘ISDS plus’ mechanism, which at
its core retains many of the features of investment arbitration that critics of ISDS
wishes to see removed.85
80 Hulley Enterprises Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation (2014) PCA Case No. AA226; Yukos
Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v. The Russian Federation (2014) PCA Case No. AA227; Veteran
Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation (2014) PCA Case No. AA28, final awards
available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1599. Accessed 28 June 2016.
81 Hodgson (2014).
82 See for example Donnan and Wagstyl (2014); Greens in the European Parliament (2014).
83 EU Commission, Draft text on investment in TTIP, supra n. 13.
84 CETA, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf (ac-
cessed 31 January 2017).
85 See for example Friends of the Earth (2016); Bernardini (2017), p. 38.
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However, it is not only the inclusion of ISDS in new trade and investment
agreements that have caused controversy. The standards of protection that should be
offered to foreign investors have also been highly contentious. Indeed, the very fact
that foreign investors are offered protections over and above those offered to
domestic investors has been called into question. Detractors of TTIP and CETA
have argued that these investor protections are not required in an agreement
between the US/EU and the EU/Canada, as all parties are relatively rich, stable, well
developed states. It is argued that domestic legislation and the domestic legal system
of each party nation is developed and impartial enough to be able to deal with
foreign investors in a fair and acceptable manner, without resorting to giving foreign
investors significant privileges over domestic investors. The following section will
examine some of the novel proposals for investment protection and regulation in
TTIP and CETA.
3.3.1 EU Commission’s Plans for Investment in TTIP and CETA:
Notable Inclusions
3.3.1.1 Right to Regulate In TTIP, the Commission proposes to strengthen the
right to regulate by the inclusion of a specific provision making reference to the EU/
US governments’ right to adopt measures and regulations in order to achieve
legitimate policy objectives, as well as a provision clarifying that TTIP would not
prevent the governments from discontinuing state aid when such aid has been
prohibited by competent state authorities (Article 2 of the proposal).86 The latter
provision is to be included presumably to avoid the recurrence of a Micula87 type of
case in the future.
3.3.1.2 Establishing an Investment Court System In Article 9 of the proposal, the
European Commission advocates for the creation of a roster of approved ‘judges’
who would be selected by the EU and US government. Judges would either be
required to be eligible to hold judicial office in their home jurisdiction or be ‘jurists
of recognised competence’. Furthermore, it suggests that third party submissions be
accepted in cases where the third party has a direct and existing interest in the
outcome of the dispute (Article 23). There is a lot of concern within the international
investment community that the proposed roster may not be as positive a move as it
may sound. For example, investors would have no say in who should be on the list,
which may lead the two governments to select arbitrators that they perceive to
generally be pro-host state rights and biased against investors. Moreover, it is
difficult to comment on the plan for third party submissions without a consolidated
text; much would depend on what is meant by a ‘direct and existing interest’ in the
dispute (Article 23).88 A very similar proposal has been green lit by the Canadians
in CETA. CETA negotiations were concluded in 2016 and the agreement was
86 EU Commission, Draft text on investment in TTIP, supra n. 13 (Art. 2).
87 Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula, SC European Food SA, SC Starmill SRI, SC Multipack SRL v. Romania,
ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Final Award of 11 December 2013.
88 EU Commission, Draft text on investment in TTIP, supra n. 13.
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signed by both parties in October 2016. The European Parliament will shortly vote
on the deal, and if approved it could be in force later in 2017.
3.3.1.3 Appellate Mechanism In TTIP, the European Commission proposes
(Article 10)89 to include a bilateral appellate mechanism, which would provide
for the review errors of law and fact in order to increase legitimacy, transparency
and predictability. The proposed bilateral appellate body is again, a step in the right
direction, however, the proposal would not remedy the wider problems associated
with international investment law and ISDS discussed above e.g. inconsistencies
and create further fragmentation of the system, adding a layer of extra procedure in
EU-US cases only. Furthermore, there is no detail in the proposition about how the
EU and US propose to dissuade the losing party in each case from making an
automatic appeal. Appeals could cost a lot of extra time and money and become par
for the course if there is no adequate filter. CETA also includes an appellate
mechanism.
3.3.1.4 A View to a Permanent Multilateral Court The Commission suggests that
a bilateral court could lead to a permanent multilateral court in the future which,
would apply to multiple agreements and between different trading partners,
also on the basis of an opt-in system. The objective would be to multilateralise
the court either as a self-standing international body or by embedding it into an
existing multilateral organization. Work has already begun on how to start this
process, in particular on aspects such as architecture, organisation, costs and
participation of other partners.90
It is submitted that such an institution would be difficult to establish on the basis
envisioned in the proposal, and would do little to address some key concerns about
ISDS e.g. consistency. Consistency would not be remedied if the new permanent
court was charged with interpreting different bilateral and plurilateral agreements.
In order to achieve consistency, arguably a multilateral framework would need to be
developed.
The EU does seem to be moving forward on its proposal to establish a
multilateral court. Whilst such an endeavour is to be welcomed, at least in theory, it
is submitted that embedding it within a multilateral organisation would be the best
way forward (rather than within a bilateral or regional organisation). However, the
authors are of the opinion that existing multilateral institutions would be ill-
equipped to house such a body. It is therefore suggested that a permanent court
should be established within a new multilateral World Investment Organisation.
89 Ibid.
90 EU Commission Concept Paper, ‘Investment in TTIP and beyond—the path for reform’, 5 May 2015,
available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153408.PDF (accessed 30 January
2017), pp. 11–12.
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4 The potential role of the World Investment Organisation
4.1 Overview and Potential Benefits
The WIO would be a forum dedicated purely to investment matters. It is hugely
important to have a new forum because existing institutions are not suitable; they
each have their own problems and perceived prejudices. Further, none of the
existing institutions are devoted to dealing with investment matters. The World
Trade Organisation (WTO) for example would not be a suitable forum, because it is
often criticised for being a ‘rich man’s club’,91 in that it prioritises the interests of
developed nations over lesser-developed ones. Its decision-making process is
hindering its capacity to take decisive decisions and take them swiftly. Moreover, it
is a body designed to promote free trade and its ethos would not necessarily be
consonant and consistent with the objectives of a body that can strike a balance
between public and private interests and take into account other societal values such
as environmental and human rights protection. Thus it is important to have a
completely ‘clean slate’, which is exactly what the WIO could provide. In terms of
dispute settlement at least, Mann and Von Moltke agree that existing dispute
settlement institutions ‘were not designed to address complex issues of public policy
that now routinely come into play in investor-state disputes’.92 One could go a step
further than Mann and Von Moltke, making a similar argument in terms of
international investment regulation more generally (as opposed to dispute settlement
only); that none of the existing institutions are adequately equipped to take on the
regulation of foreign investment.
The establishment of the WIO would lead to a system that better balances the
interests of international investment stakeholders. In the past, concerns have been
raised about the balance of power and balance of the competing interests in
investment relationships between investors and investment host states. It is often
alleged that investors hold all the power, and can effectively hold the state to ransom
through the threat of the initiation of ISDS proceedings. In turn, this can lead to
‘regulatory chill’. There is no general consensus on the exact meaning of the phrase
‘regulatory chill’,93 but at the very least, it is accepted that investment arbitration as
an institution can influence the course of policy development.94 This occurs when
policy makers shelve new regulations or policies, because they believe that
investment disputes may arise were the new policy to be introduced.
Moreover, the WIO would enable a redress of the balance of power in the foreign
investment law-making processes. In so-called ‘traditional’ BITs (those between
developing states and developed nations95), developing states are often at a
91 Salzman (2000), p. 769; Mathiason (2003).
92 Mann and Von Moltke (2005).
93 Tienhaara (2011).
94 Ibid.
95 The distinction between developed and developing states may be becoming less clear, as states such as
China and India, which would still be technically classed as developing countries are large capital
exporting states, which are catching up to western foreign investment ideologies rather quickly.
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disadvantage as they are usually keener to attract investment, and as such may wish
to be perceived as ‘investor friendly’ nations. In order to retain this ‘friendly’
reputation, states may agree to limit their right to regulate their internal affairs more
severely. This would give the investor confidence that their investment will be safer,
and thus induce them to invest in said state. This element of competition for
investment, and the benefits that such investment can bring to lesser-developed
nations (e.g. wealth, jobs and infrastructure), may serve to put developing nations at
a negotiating disadvantage. A WIO that operates under a multilateral framework
could lead to the creation of a fairer, and more inclusive system. In turn, this would
reflect in the creation of a truly balanced multilateral agreement. In multilateral
negotiations, developing states could form negotiating ‘blocks’ in order to ensure
that their interests are prioritised and heard, and without the element of competition
described above.
Furthermore, the creation of the WIO could enhance consistency, predictability
and fairness within the international investment regime. Consistency is an often-
cited, elusive goal of the law of foreign investment.96 The WIO could enable
consistency to be achieved, in terms of the outcomes of disputes, but also in the
understanding and interpretation of the lex specialis of international investment law
and general international legal principles.
Predictability and legal certainty would also be achieved with the WIO in a
number of ways. Most obviously, a dedicated investment court (with an appellate
mechanism) would enable a solid body of jurisprudence to be built up, perhaps even
based on the doctrine of formal legal precedent.
Lastly, the creation of the WIO would increase fairness in the foreign investment
regime. Different types of fairness would be achieved in a number of different ways.
Firstly, fairness between the interests of developing and developed states would be
enhanced due to improved negotiating processes and goals, whereby the wishes and
desires of less developed nations are heard and acted upon, rather than ignored or
railroaded by their richer counterparts. Furthermore, fairness could be achieved
between the interests of investors and states e.g. investor protection versus the
regulatory power of sovereign states by the negotiation of a truly balanced
multilateral investment agreement.
One potential criticism that the WIO might face, is that states should be free to
set their own investment agenda at the national level instead of having an
international regime. South Africa clearly believes that this should be the case,
hence they are taking steps to nationalise their investment protection with the
Foreign Investment Bill.97 South Africa believes that the inflows of investment will
not be harmed by withdrawing their BITs and nationalising foreign investment
regulation. However, the Promotion and Protection of Foreign Investment Bill is
currently in the drafting process; accordingly, if it is indeed adopted, the effects will
Footnote 95 continued
Nonetheless, the distinction may be useful to understand the historical underpinnings of the law of foreign
investment.
96 Dimsey (2008), pp. 36–37; also see Paulsson and Rawding (1995).
97 Gazzini (2014), pp. 46–48.
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only come to light in the months and years to come. It is worth considering the
potential counterfactual; that when states terminate their BITs they might lose
foreign investment.98 If this happens, in a bid to re-attract or attract more
investment, states choosing to nationalise their investment protection could
inadvertently cause a race to the bottom in terms of the regulatory power of
sovereign states in the long run. This is a significant risk. Thus, it may be better to
regulate the investment regime at an international level.
4.2 The Practicalities of Establishing a WIO
The WIO could not function properly in the current foreign investment climate. The
thousands of BITs and IIAs, each with similar, but potentially important differences
in wording would mean that a WIO would be difficult to implement, and in real
terms would only serve to further muddy the already very murky waters. Therefore,
it is submitted that a WIO could only function under a formal multilateral treaty
framework. Existing BITs and IIAs would need to be terminated eventually, and
states would need to negotiate and sign a multilateral investment agreement (which
would serve to regulate FDI on a global level, and which would establish a WIO and
court with an appellate mechanism). The negotiation of a multilateral investment
agreement would be a tall order, and not easy to achieve. There have been several
unsuccessful attempts to negotiate a multilateral treaty in the past. From the Havana
Charter99 to the Multilateral Agreement on Investment,100 negotiations have
systematically failed to achieve large-scale multilateral co-operation on investment
regulation. It could be argued that the previous negotiations have always failed,
partly because of the lack of a credible forum for negotiations.101 Previous
negotiations have always seemed to run into the same old problems with developed/
developing nations and their competing interests. Thus, negotiating and establishing
a WIO under the auspices of an existing organisation e.g. the UN World Bank or the
WTO would be highly unsatisfactory. The WIO would need to represent a ‘clean
slate’. Thus, a new, completely independent organisation should be established. It is
highly likely that negotiations for a WIO within an existing organisation such as the
World Bank or the WTO would fail, as all previous attempts to negotiate under their
organisations have. Now is the time to create a balanced global regime; it is
submitted that this can only be done with a completely new negotiating forum; the
WIO. The negotiations to create a multilateral treaty could be undertaken with
complete neutrality, and free from perceived organisational biases or agendas.
98 The possible outcomes from BIT termination are almost impossible to predict at this time; partly
because there is no agreement about the extent to which BITs attract investment in the first place, see n.
77.
99 Havana Charter 1948 (full text), http://www.worldtradelaw.net/misc/havana.pdf (accessed 1 July
2014).
100 OECD, Multilateral Agreement on Investment, http://www.oecd.org/investment/
internationalinvestmentagreements/multilateralagreementoninvestment.htm (accessed 2 February 2017).
For in depth discussion of the previous attempts to establish a global multilateral investment treaty see
Nieuwenhuys and Brus (2001); Dattu (2000), p. 275; Karl (2002), p. 293.
101 Salzman (2000); Mathiason (2003).
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Arguably we already have informal or de facto multilateralism,102 so the negotiation
of a formal multilateral treaty may not be as revolutionary as it initially may sound.
As for the substantive provisions of such a multilateral treaty, Articles 10–14 of
the recent Tokyo Resolution of the Institut de Droit International103 could serve as
inspiration for the negotiators.104
In terms of the internal organisation of the WIO, it could take inspiration from
the structure of existing successful international organisations. Due to the naturally
close relationship between trade and investment, an obvious source of inspiration
would seem to be the WTO. However, the WIO founding members and negotiators
could also take inspiration from other successful international organisations (e.g.
ICSID, WIPO, WHO and the UN). The WTO, for example, appears to have a well
functioning organisational structure. WTO decisions are made on the basis of
consensus. The WTO’s highest-level decision-making body is the Ministerial
Conference, which meets biennially. Below the Ministerial Conference is the
General Council, which consists of ambassadors and heads of delegation in Geneva,
and sometimes officials sent from member states on an individual basis. The
General Council meets several times each year in Geneva. The General Council also
meets as the Trade Policy Review Body and as the Dispute Settlement Body.
Beneath the General Council are the Goods Council, Services Council and
Intellectual Property (IP) Council, each of which reports to the General Council.
Beneath the Goods, Services and IP Council are various Committees and Working
Groups. The day to day running of the WTO is overseen by the Secretariat (headed
by the Director General), which consists of around 640 staff based in the Geneva
headquarters. The Secretariat is not a decision-making body; rather it provides
technical and legal support and assistance to the decision-making bodies and
member states, as well as prospective members.105
The new WIO could utilise a similar organisational structure to the WTO,106 with
states as signatories to a founding convention, designating them as members of the
organisation. The members could meet annually or bi-annually at a conference in
order to decide on the organisation’s priorities for the next period and make
decisions on investment matters within the sphere of the organisation’s mandate.
Under the conference, a number of bodies for example a court-like body and a
general council or body which would meet regularly in order to carry out the
organisation’s agenda for a set period. Below the general body and court, a number
of specialised committees could undertake more specific work e.g. investment and
human rights, investment and the environment, and investment in least developed
nations. Committees could create working parties or groups to work on detailed
102 Schill (2009).
103 Institut de Droit International, Tokyo Resolution, supra n. 36.
104 For more information on the role of the Institute and the Resolutions that it adopts, see Institut de
Droit International, ‘History (Origins)’, http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/navig_history.html (accessed 2
February 2017).
105 WTO website, ‘The organization’, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr02_
e.htm (accessed 2 February 2017).
106 For more information on the organizational structure of the WTO, see WTO website, ‘Organizational
structure’, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org2_e.htm (accessed 2 February 2017).
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projects within the broader committee’s remit. The conference, general council,
court and committees would be the decision-making bodies of the WIO. It is
submitted that the WIO should not operate a consensual decision-making process.
Due to reasons of efficiency it is submitted that the WIO should work on a majority
voting system.
In terms of the day to day running of the organisation, the WIO could utilise a
secretariat system, led by a director general. The secretariat would not have
decision-making power; rather it would provide all the administrative assistance
required to successfully run the WIO. The organisational structure proposed herein
is a basic proposal; clearly if a WIO were to be created, extensive thought would
need to be put into the creation of the optimum organisational arrangements.
4.3 The World Investment Court
As noted above, the EU’s ultimate aim in terms of investment dispute settlement is a
permanent investment court. The suggestion to create such a court is not new; Van
Harten,107 Goldhaber108 and Subedi109 actually proposed this idea a number of
years ago.110 However, it is submitted that the proposed court cannot come to
fruition without undertaking other reforms first, namely the creation of a multilateral
treaty framework111 and the establishment of the WIO.
Van Harten has articulated his views on the matter in great detail.112 He believes
that the way forward is to encourage states ‘to support a multilateral code that would
establish an international court with comprehensive jurisdiction over the adjudica-
tion of investor claims’.113 Van Harten goes on to state that the newly created world
investment court he envisages would ideally have obligatory jurisdiction over all
claims filed by investors in the first instance, where the states involved were
members to the newly negotiated multilateral treaty. It is intended that the court
would become the default mechanism for the resolution of all investment disputes; a
sort of one-stop shop, in order to achieve the coveted goals of consistency and
fairness, and at the same time, solve the problems associated with forum shopping
and parallel procedures in investment disputes. A WIO and court would be
ineffective if they did not have mandatory jurisdiction in all investment matters.
Turning his attention to the staffing of the court, Van Harten asserts that twelve or
fifteen judges would be required, and that they should be appointed by states for ‘a
set term based on the model of other international courts’.114 For example, the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) is staffed by 15 judges, each elected for a term of
9 years by the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly. In order to
107 Van Harten (2008).
108 Goldhaber (2004).
109 Subedi (2016), pp. 201–202.
110 Concept paper, supra n. 90, pp. 11–12.
111 Van Harten (2008).
112 Van Harten (2007), p. 179.
113 Ibid., p. 180.
114 Ibid.
62 N. Butler, S. Subedi
123
ensure continuity, one-third of the judges is elected every three years. Judges are
elected as experts in international law, and as persons of the highest moral character.
There are also geographical considerations; the court must not include more than
one national of the same state, and the judges must be fairly representative of global
society and the principal legal systems of the world.115 The WIO could be staffed in
a similar manner to the ICJ i.e. electing 15 judges to serve 9 year terms (or similar),
with exclusivity clauses in their contracts (so that they cannot act as adjudicators
outside the WIO). Judges could be selected using a majority voting procedure from
a large pool of state nominations, giving the member states one vote each. Being
staffed in this way would enable the court to ensure the independence of its judges,
and the number of judges would allow several three-judge panels to sit
simultaneously in order to keep up with the increased demand, which has been
witnessed in investment dispute settlement in recent years. The judges would be
selected to hear cases on a rotating basis by the court’s president or by random
assignment. If the impartiality of a judge is challenged, the other members of the
court will pronounce on the matter. As with other international courts, the judges of
the world investment court would be prohibited from taking part in activities that
might be deemed incompatible with their professional duties and which may
compromise their independence.116
4.4 An Appellate Mechanism within the WIO Court
The creation of an appeal mechanism in ISDS has been hotly debated since the mid
to late 2000s.117 More recently, the EU Commission has pursued the idea of setting
up appellate mechanism in CETA. Furthermore, in its paper on investment in TTIP
the EU Commission asserts that it is intended that an appellate mechanism be
include in final agreement.118 Opponents to the idea, such as Legum119 have argued
that an appeal mechanism is not feasible in the current climate i.e. of thousands of
BITs/IIAs, because it would be impossible to harmonise interpretation of thousands
of agreements; even if this were possible, it was not intended by the states who
negotiated them anyway. These sorts of arguments would not be sustainable if the
appeal mechanism was operated under the auspices of a WIO and court, which
would in turn be operating under a multilateral agreement.
An appeal mechanism has obvious advantages; not least, it would provide the
best chance of achieving consistent interpretations of the substantive principles of
international investment law. Furthermore it would enable a body of jurisprudence
to be built up, and if it operates a doctrine of precedent, it would encourage greater
predictability of outcomes and would enhance the application of the rule of law in
115 ICJ, ‘Members of the Court’, http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=2 (accessed 2
February 2017).
116 Ibid.
117 See for example, Sauvant (2008); Gantz (2006), p. 39; Bishop (2006); Qureshi (2008).
118 Concept paper, supra n. 90, pp. 8–10.
119 Legum (2008), pp. 231–240.
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the investment regime. Additionally, it would provide a corrective mechanism for
those occasions where, for whatever reason, the tribunal of first instance erred. Such
errors, at present, largely go unresolved in the present system of ISDS with its
limited scope for review.120
In terms of the practicalities of the appellate mechanism, it is envisaged that the
WIO could emulate many of the features of the WTO appellate body (AB), which is
seen as highly successful, ‘[The AB] seems to me still today an extraordinary
achievement that comes close to a miracle […] and which has proved so far to be a
notable success’.121 Praise for the WTO AB has been echoed by many other
experts122; indeed, Zimmermann states that the appellate mechanism has been
hailed as an ideal potential model for dispute settlement procedures in other areas of
public international law.123
Thinking about the practicalities of the WIO AB, Walde has suggested that if
appeal is to be introduced in investment disputes, a standing body, much like the
WTO AB would be preferable.124 This would support the incorporation of an appeal
mechanism in the newly created WIO, as proposed herein. The WTO AB is
composed of seven members who are appointed by the Dispute Settlement Body to
serve for four-year terms, with the possibility of being reappointed once. The AB
membership is broadly representative of membership in the WTO. The AB
members have recognised expertise in the field of law and international trade and
should not be affiliated to any government.125
When it comes to the scope of appeal of the WIO AB, perhaps the WIO can once
again borrow from the WTO.126 The WTO AB’s scope of review is limited to legal
errors. Though, in one of its decisions,127 the AB has stated that, ‘[w]hether or not a
panel has made an objective assessment of the facts before it, as required by Article
11 of the DSU, is […] a legal question which, if properly raised on appeal, would
fall within the scope of appellate review’.128 Therefore, it seems the AB can, in
some limited circumstances, offer a very narrow form of factual review. It may be
argued that only errors of law should be reviewable, in order to minimise the
number of appeals sought. This will keep the caseload of the AB relatively low, and
provide for efficient resolution of appealed disputes. On the other hand, it could be
120 For more on annulment see Caron (1992), p. 21; Schreuer (2001), p. 891.
121 Ehlermann (2003), p. 695.
122 See for example Lockhart and Voon (2005).
123 Zimmermann (2005), p. 27.
124 Walde (2006), pp. 135–144. See also Ngangjoh-Hodu and Ajibo (2015), p. 308.
125 WTO, ‘Dispute settlement: the appellate body’, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
appellate_body_e.htm (accessed 2 February 2017).
126 Art. 17 of the WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
1994 (full text) is available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm (accessed 28 June
2016). The Understanding was negotiated as part of the Uruguay round of trade negotiations, signed in
Marrakesh in 1994 and entered into force in January 1995.
127 EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB
(WTO AB 16 January 1998).
128 EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), ibid., as cited in Legum (2005).
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argued that a more flexible approach, with some capacity to correct errors of fact (as
demonstrated by the WTO AB) should be taken.
Though the existing academic literature in support of an appellate mechanism is
predicated largely on simply creating an extra layer of arbitration in ISDS (probably
using a standing appellate body which would hear disputes arising from existing
BITs and IIA), the arguments can be applied to the establishment of an appeal
mechanism within the court of the WIO, as proposed herein. In fact, many of the
arguments for an appeal mechanism would be strengthened if the mechanism were
incorporated into a court and WIO system, as they would maximise the potential to
achieve consistency and coherence.
4.5 The Role of Non-State Actors within the Proposed WIO
In the present international investment law regime non-state actors play an
important role. Most importantly, investors are non-state actors. They derive rights
from BITs and IIAs, the most important of which in the present system is access to
ISDS. The proposal herein to establish a WIO and court would essentially mean
maintenance of the status quo in this regard; a multilateral investment agreement
such as the one proposed in this article would give similar rights to investors i.e.
protections for their investment and access to a neutral dispute settlement forum.
However, the multilateral agreement establishing the WIO and court could also be
used to balance up the current system by placing obligations on investors to act in a
responsible manner e.g. not to degrade the host state environment or not to commit
human rights abuses. There is some debate within the academic literature as to how
this could be achieved (given that at present BITs, and in the future the multilateral
investment agreement) constitute agreements between state parties; thus how can a
non-state actor be obliged by an agreement to which he/she is not party? Basically it
is possible to limit access to investor protection provisions by making investor
protection conditional on compliance with certain obligations e.g. to comply with
the domestic law of the host state. In this way, the host state can better control, and
place obligations on the investor than the current BIT/IIA regime does.
Another significant role of non-state actors in the current regime of foreign
investment law is the ability of non-state actors to intervene in investment disputes
through amicus curiae. Many BITs and IIAs enable non-state actors and non-parties
to the agreement to make submissions to investment tribunals. This could continue
if the proposed WIO and court is established; in the rules of procedure, provisions
could be included in order to permit these important submissions to the court and
Appellate Body. Further, non-state actors, whether investors or other civil society
organisations concerned with environmental or human rights protection, could be
granted observer status by the WIO and allowed to participate in some policy-
making deliberations by the WIO. For instance, the UN Human Rights Council
allows civil society representatives to participate in various of its meetings including
the interactive dialogue sessions with special procedures mandate holders. The work
of the Council is enriched by their participation and its work becomes more
transparent. A similar mechanism could be developed for participation by non-state
actors in policy formulation by the WIO.
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4.6 The Relationship between the Law of Foreign Investment and Other
Branches of Public International Law
International investment law is a member of the family of public international law.
When it comes to interpreting the rules of international investment law or the
provisions of BITs, IIAs or FTAs and ascertaining the scope and status of such
treaties the investment tribunals apply the public international law rules of
interpretation of treaties as stipulated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. In other words, issues within international investment law should not be
considered in isolation but as part of the overall framework of public international
law. However, many international investment tribunals often become reluctant to
take into account other competing principles of international law such as
international environmental law or international human rights law when making
their decisions or interpreting the rules of international investment law.
A state that has concluded a BIT or IIA or an FTA according a series of
protection to investors may become a party to an international treaty designed to
protect the environment or to promote human rights. The state may then have to
require natural and juridical persons within the country, including foreign investors
who would be operating within the country after acquiring legal personality of some
kind in the country to conform to the international standards stipulated in such
international treaties. The state is duty bound to fulfil its obligations undertaken
through such treaties. In such a situation a public international law adjudicatory
body would be expected to have regard for such obligations of states when
interpreting the rules of international investment law or the provisions of BITs, IIAs
or FTAs.
However, many international investment tribunals have been reluctant to do so in
making their decisions or have given precedence to the provisions concerning
investment protection over societal or global values stipulated in other international
treaties. The tendency on the part of many international investment tribunals has
been to regard investment disputes between foreign investors and host governments
as a narrow commercial dispute to be adjudicated on the basis of a narrow set of
rules according protection to foreign investors. Therefore, if a WIO and an
international investment court were to be established, they, as public international
law institutions, will be operating within the framework of public international law
and the jurisprudence coming out of the court would be more balanced. The WIO
and the court would bring more cohesion in the development of both international
investment law and public international law that is conducive to achieving the
higher objectives of the international community and the international legal order.
5 Conclusion
The creation of a WIO and court is clearly a very ambitious proposal that would be
difficult to bring to fruition. As Pauwelyn asserts,
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Even if, on the face of things, the benefits of reform clearly outweigh the cost
of bringing about the change, reform may be blocked because of information
problems (e.g. difficulties in convincing people of the benefits or feasibility of
change), public choice (e.g. incumbents such as certain arbitrators or law firms
benefitting from the status quo being more influential in the political process
than advocates of reform) or network-related costs (e.g. standard appointments
mechanisms or BIT clauses being difficult to change because of network
effects).129
The creation of a WIO and the associated reforms discussed in this article clearly
have higher ‘upfront’ costs than current regime of BITs i.e. the time it would take to
negotiate multilateral treaties and put in place an infrastructure for such an
organisation. However, these higher up front costs could lead to significant ‘down
the line’ benefits. The creation of a WIO could provide an important opportunity to
achieve important and delicate balances of power within the law of foreign
investment. Firstly, thought could be devoted to the balance of power between
developed and developing nations when it comes to foreign investment. The hand of
lesser-developed nations is thought to have been forced by developed states who
hold more power when it comes to bilateral treaty negotiations. Add to this the fact
that developing states typically try to attract as much foreign investment as possible,
due to the advantages it is thought to bring (e.g. infrastructure, wealth and
employment), and investors from developed nations often have more money to
invest, it is clear that the balance of power between these two types of nations in the
present BIT dominated system is far from perfect. A multilateral forum such as the
WIO would enable developing nations to have a stronger voice and even allow them
to band together in negotiating blocks in order to protect their interests in numbers.
Moreover, the creation of a WIO and significant modification to the regulatory
climate of foreign investment would enable reconsideration of the balance of power
between investors and states. There is presently much debate about the balance of
power between states and investors, particularly within the context of the on-going
TTIP negotiations, which has brought the issue to the fore. It is often alleged that
foreign investors are almost able to hold states to ransom through the threat of
bringing an action using existing ISDS provisions. States are allegedly scared to
legislate and regulate in their own interests and in the interests of their citizens
because they are afraid that in doing so they will potentially breach investment
obligations and land themselves with having to pay a multi-million pound award, or
at the very least an average of $4 million of legal costs per case.130 Fundamental
reform of the regulatory framework and dispute settlement, as advocated herein,
could enable the balance of power to be recalibrated; allowing states to regain the
regulatory control that they are alleged to have lost under the present ‘regime’.
Finally, establishment of a WIO and court would also enable the balance of
power to be redressed in terms of private tribunals pronouncing on public issues.
There has been much discussion in recent years about the fact that privately
129 Pauwelyn (2014).
130 Hodgson (2014).
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appointed tribunals are increasingly involved in the adjudication of issues of public
policy e.g. human rights and the protection of the environment through ISDS.
Accordingly, the standard of review in ISDS has come under scrutiny and been
criticised fiercely of late. Giving mandatory and exclusive jurisdiction to the WIO’s
court would alleviate this problem. Qualified and impartial judges would be
employed on a full time basis solely to adjudicate investment disputes. This would
undoubtedly enhance consistency in investment dispute settlement, which would in
turn promote the rule of law and enhance legitimacy in the decision-making process
and review procedures.
The creation of a WIO may also be difficult to achieve due to the apparent trend
of international institutions seemingly having fallen out of favour. As Goldhaber
asserts, ‘all-powerful global institutions may be out of fashion’.131 However,
perhaps the WTO could serve as important inspiration in this regard, and evidence
against the assertion of such a trend. Although it has not managed to escape
criticism completely, the WTO is largely regarded as a success132; particularly its
Dispute Settlement Body (including AB) which is seen as the ‘linchpin’133 of the
system. Recently, some critics have argued that the WTO is failing/losing
popularity/nearing its end especially with the missing of the Bali deadline,134 and
the ongoing negotiations of trade agreements, such as TTIP, which are being
negotiated outside of the multilateral trading system. However, one could view
these as supplementary agreements, not substitutive. The multilateral system of the
WTO has been dealing with a deluge of Regional Trade Agreements for many
years, and it could be argued that the multilateral regime has not been damaged by
such agreements. Indeed, it could be argued that the multilateral regime has
benefitted in many ways, with global trade on the whole being increased by such
agreements and a renewed enthusiasm/interest from many states in global trade
policy, with a bicycle effect whereby regional negotiations have triggered
consideration of certain issues at the multilateral level. Furthermore, it is important
to note that non-members states are still initiating accession to the WTO, and
negotiating rounds and gatherings are still on going.135 Thus, the WTO provides a
good example of how a global, multilateral organisation can survive and even thrive
in the often-difficult current political and economic conditions. There is no reason
why an analogous investment organisation could not do the same. It is also
important to remember that, as Walde pointed out, ICSID was not popular when it
was first established; over time it has become increasingly so.136 Interestingly, large
regulatory institutions are also being proposed in other fields of international
economic law. Lastra recently contended that a world financial organisation might
131 Goldhaber (2004).
132 See for example WTO, ‘Ten benefits of the WTO trading system’, https://depts.washington.edu/
wtohist/Research/documents/10benefits.pdf (accessed 2 February 2017); on dispute settlement see for
example Zimmermann (2005); Davey (2014).
133 Bhala (1999), as cited in Zimmermann (2005).
134 Shotter, Kazmin and Donnan (2014).
135 Howse (2014).
136 Walde (2006), pp. 135–144.
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be beneficial for global financial regulation, which at present is very fragmented
(much like the current state of affairs in international investment law).137
Finally, Sornarajah138 recently argued that co-ordination or the creation of a
‘regime’ (such as that essentially proposed herein) is no longer possible because the
system is so fragmented and moving away from neo-liberalistic ideals. It could be
argued that this is precisely the time to push for the recognition of a regime; leading
to harmonisation and unification when it is most needed.
Nonetheless, this paper has demonstrated a case for the establishment of a WIO.
It is at least an option for reform that might be considered. It is certainly the most
radical suggestion for reform of the area, which would undoubtedly be difficult to
achieve. However, the potential gains of such fundamental reform could make the
difficulty of the task worthwhile, and could solve many, if not all of the problems
associated with the law of foreign investment at present. Given the gravity of the
matter and the wide range of issues that need to be tackled within the regime of
international investment law it would be better to take a holistic approach to the
regulation of foreign investment in order to protect global societal values while
ensuring flow of foreign investment from one jurisdiction to another. Thus, the time
may have come to take a bold step and create a WIO and court, to deal with the
issues relating to investment protection and regulation in a systematic manner.
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